The only way to sort out the problem
was ro create the law that will force information flow and get the system running.

Need to

ave

to ~ca n all the reports and to use the
sca nn ed images as information carriers.
Sraremen rs rhar say rhar minefield
report clara lose their importance with
time are simply wrong. In the end, they
become the only wrinen proof of co ntamination. A survey report, while an
expert's opi nion, is still just an opinion
on the possible mine risk for certain areas.

So what could be a solution ro have
an information system and have data entered into it? First, an absolute necess ity
is ro have clear, well-defined proced ures
providing as much data as poss ible and,
rioritization and the
if possible, have ir organized in such a
nformation System
way that they can be entered inro an information system with a lot of predefined
I t is not always easy to find a
va lues. In order to emphasize rhe impor- mathematic algorithm to defi ne prioritance of certain fields, ir is advisable ro ties. Sometimes even scoring does not
have some fields that must be entered as help; for instance, the complicated stare
a condition to proceed.
structure reflects procedures for priority
Another problem is how to keep the definition. Also, the term "impact" can
entered information. Our experience be understood in many d ifferent ways.
shows that there are rwo solutions: either Speaking of complexity, here is a Bosnia
not delete records (just declare them can- and Herzegovina state structure equation:
celed) or have well-fo rmed and carefully
1 Stare+ [I Entity+ I Entity (I 0 Canprogrammed routi nes for record deletion.
tons)+ District] = 14 Governments
Over rime and with the expansion of acTaking into consideration the fact
tivities, it becomes obvious rhar some sort char rea l executive autho ri ty lies in muof traceability has robe implemented, and nici palities (more tha n 120), it becomes
ideally, there should be a pri nted journal obvious why priorities cannot be defined
file (log book for major changes).
based just on some "points."
A need to have a chan ce to educate
Through six years of data collection,
and re-educate staff is more related to we lea rn ed that where the mines are and
program managers, as they often forger the real impact of rhem on the populathe simple fact char one may gain knowl- tion and society is the question. The
edge nor o nly through trial and error, bur problem is that priorities have ro reflect
also by attending seminars. This is nor needs and be part of plans for developon ly more cost-effective, bur it also ere- ment as desired by authorities. Otherwise
ares a sense of importance for the staff ir's simply not working.
and in the long run creates a bener environment and more effective employees.
outheastern urope
Besides the problems mentioned so
pproach
far, there are also some po ints that simply can nor be over looked. When the staff
ln order ro have a broader scope and
moves, things are forgotten. Being (at ro share experie nce with neighboring
least in Bosnia) the first organ ization in countries, we used an opportunity kindly
place maintaining a live database, the staff provided by the European Commission
educated during rhe process become an (EC) to starr a project on regional data sharasset desired by other companies. By rule, ing. So far, rhe beneficiaries of the project
salaries reflect funding, and iris difficult are the following countries in southeastern
ro keep quality staff together.
Europe (SEE) region: Slovenia, Croatia,
Another problem is purely physical: Bosnia and Herzegov ina, Serbia and
paper copies are inclined to disappear or Montenegro, Alban ia, Macedon ia, and
get damaged by manipulation. W ith luck Azerbaijan-and chis list is likely to expand.
(from the program's point of view), the
So far, we have sent four exports ro
amount of activities is growi ng and rhe the Joint Research Center and informapaper archive is growing, wh ich means t ion interchange has proven possib le.
more data to enter. A solut ion wou ld be Based on data inconsistency, it becomes
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obvious that some sort of standardization
has to rake place. Th us, we agreed on
standard hardware and software packages.
In order to be able ro show data for the
region on a single map, we agreed on basics for use of the satellite images, and we
have images provided for the region.
Prior to the information inrerchange,
we had a fou r-day meeting in Sarajevo
yielding some information interchange
core standards for SEE. 1 Based on experience gained through these activities,
exported data sent could be harmonized.
Once a standard for information interchange is provided, information can be
interchanged. An exporting exercise helped
a lor because some of the mistakes became
visible. A " house cleaning" was necessary.
More than that, countries within the reg io n are help ing each other sorr out
problems. A good illustration of this is the
BH MAC's GPS campaign in Albania.
Since all participants p rovided data
without any problems, SEE could be used
as an exampl e of equali ty in divers ity. In
f:1ct, once the "one-size-does-not- fi r-all"
phi losophy was accepted, it was considerab ly easy to achieve awareness on
info rmario n-sharing benefl ts.
Having seen all aspects ofinformarion
sharing and cooperation, I think it is rime
for the Global Information Exchange Standard for mine action. We fully support rhe
Mine Action Extensible Markup Language
(maXM L) initiative, which becomes more
and more accepted as a standard protocol
for information interchange. •
Endnotes
I. Results of the conference can be seen at
http://www. bh mac.org/bh mac/info/ conferences/
conferences_e.htm

The BHMAC:
A New Law, New Structure and New
Hope in Bosnia
After years of struggling w ith an inefficient m ine action structure, a new
demining law has revitalized t he Bosnia-He rzegovi na M i ne Action Center
(BH MAC). Bosnians f i nally have the means t o conquer their land m ine
troubles.

by JJ Scott, MAIC
Introduction
A new law enacted in March of2002
marked the beginning of a Bosnian mine
action renaissance that will improve everything from na t ional program
management to individual minefield procedu res. A complete restructuring and
reorga nization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
Mine Action Center (BHMAC) will finally aiJow the "head" of Bosnian mine
action to effectively d irect the bodies beneath it, and to responsi bly report ro rhe
govern ment through the Demining
Commission. The Bosnian government
formulated the demining law and will
help fund irs implementation-an extrao rdinary step toward its goal of
effective national program ownership.
The new law and the structures it creates
fi nally give Bosnian m ine action practitio ners a management system that is
attuned to their own culture and unique
land m ine situation- indispensable weapons in the struggle to free their nation
fro m the landmines holding it hostage.

ontact Information
History/War
Zoran Grujic
Assistant Director of Information
BHMAC
Z maja od Bosne 8
BFPO 543
Sa rajevo 71000
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Tel: 387-6 1-1429-14
Fax: 387-33-667-3 11
E-mail: Zo ran_G@BHMAC.ORG
Website: www.bhmac.org/bhmac

Over rhree years of fighting ( 19921995) among several different armies
along undulating front lines left "a very
complicated and extensive [landmine]
problem in a complex envi ronment," says
Mr. D avid Rowe, P rogram Manager of
the United Nations Development Prog ram ( UND P) and adviser to the
BHMAC, Demining Commission and

International Board of Donors. Mr. Rowe
moved ro Bosnia during the war and has
been involved in Bosnian mine action
since rhe beginning. He has survived rhe
BHMAC's progression from mine action
side-show to center-stage attraction.
To appreciate the turnaround now
raking place, some background is necessary. Mr. Rowe describes the mine threat
left by the war as "quire complex because
of its extent, because of its low density
and because of irs random nature," making "the landmi ne problem here less
quantifiable than in other pans of rhe
world."
Knowing refugees and imernally displaced persons (lOPs) would soon try
returning home, rhe United Nations set
up a mine action center in 1996. The
inrernarional community decided char
Bosnians should run their own mine action program, handing over all
responsibilities on July I, 1998. The
Bosnians inherited a srrucwre rhat was
"a development program in a l 00 percen r task-o riented en vi ron m en r. . . , a
decision perhaps more designed ro accommod ate political n eeds than
immediate practical pose-war considerations," says Mr. Rowe. Under char
structure, the State-level BHMAC was
essentially subservient to rhe rwo relatively autonomous Entity MACs (o ne
representing rhe Federation of BosniaH erzegovina and one for the Republ ic of
Srbska), effectively preventing it from
wielding any real managerial influence
over demining operations. Man y in
Bosnia feel that the United Nations
handed the program over to Bosnian au-
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rhorities a bit roo early, before either rhe
MAC or the Bosnian government was
ready.
By late 2000, a budget crisis created
and exacerbated by allegations of corruptio n and mis
at the

-.-..~~~

A BHMAC truck waits behind the BH MAC
headquarters, beside the Marshal Tito
Barracks .

levels left the three MACs on the verge
of collapse. Demining and surveying operations slowed dramatically. ln a drastic
(bur nor completely uncalled for) move,
rhe High Representative dismissed the
three-man Demining Commission, citing corruption and misuse of influence.
lr was a highly visible symptom of the
otherwise shadowy affliction lurking
through government corridors, covertly
sapping rhe MACs' dedicated staffs of
their ability to manage life-saving mine
action activities-the organization's ultimate mandate. Mr. Rowe feels "rhe
national ream should be commended for
keeping rhe show alive and going forward-albeit slowly" during rhis period.

NewHope

ELS'"Beaver" exits a
minefield just
outside of Sarajevo.

"Sometimes th ings have to be at rhe
brink of collapse-it has robe very clear
to all involved that things are not wellbefore you ca n get positive cha nge and
head in the right direction," Mr. Rowe
rema rks, looking back at that critical period. The Bosnian government realized
rhar much of irs economic, health care,
infrastructure and redevelopment woes
were related to leftover landmines, and
they finally made a concerted effort to
address the problem with a logical, legitimately Bosnian solution. The Bosnian
mine action structure needed replacement, nor refurbishment, and in early
200 I work starred on a law rhar would
create a new, tenable organization. W ith
considerable fo reign encouragement, lawmakers hashed our the derails over rhe
next few months, and the legislature approved Bosnia's land mark Demining Law

in March 2002.

Management Level
The law centralized management
and development functions-formerly
sha red and/or fought over by rhe two
Enriry MACs-wi rhin the BH MAC,
leaving day-to-day operational decisions
ro subordinate offices in Sarajevo (the
Federation) and Banja Luka (the Republic). Mr. Dusan Gavran, newly appointed
Direcror of the BHMAC, believes that
this new arrangement will yield several
tangible benefits: "Before, rhe entity governments dictated priorities. Nothing was
coordinated. Now, one ministry-level department will rule over the rwo
governments. The Entity governments
will submit priorities, and all information will be concentrated in one spot. The
Bosnian council of ministers will then
decide the priorities." This should increase commun ication and cooperation
between the Entities and rhe BHMAC,
bur if they can't reach an agreement on
priorities, the central BHMAC will always have the last wo rd.
Since most fun ctions previously carried our by the Entity MACs are now
under the BH MAC's jurisdiction, many
people had to update their business cards
as their jobs, offices and/or rides changed.
"Often, the person who was performing
a certain function simply transferred that
funct io n to a new system, perhaps nor
even in a new office," remarks Mr. Rowe.
He adds, "This was nor designed to be a
great purge of people. Ir was designed to
set up rhe centralized structure necessary
to formulate and man age nat ional
[demini ng] policy."Therefore, "when rhe
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dust settles, we may end up with abour
rhe same number of people, the difference being the way in which rhey work
with in a single cooperative body. " By retaining a core of experienced workers, the
BHMAC will accompl ish more than just
conserve pink sli ps. Long-rime employees know what they're doing, have
endured t rying rimes, and rhus constitute
a priceless Bosnian mine action asset.
Prior ro his arrival at rhe BHMAC, Mr.
Gavran heard that "the BHMAC had
insufficient technical staff, that there were
no experts there." After a few weeks on
the job, he saw rhar his staff was so experienced, "they have become experts," even
without special training. Those apprentices-turned-masters will help lead rhe
Bosnian mine action revolution from rhe
rop.

Operational Level
The redesigned BHMAC and irs
subservient Entity offices are already beginning the ir work, and Mr. Rowe
exp ects to see "some cons iderable advances fairly quickly, especially in the area
of lo ng-term strategy and management
of rhe annual work plans." Mine action
requires a good roa dmap; rhe new
BHMAC can provide rhar. Bur a map
doesn't help anyone when used in correctly. Planning and management are
im portant, bur nothing is accomplished
if no one carries our rhe operation correedy.
Demining in Bosnia has nor been
ineffective; on the contrary, Mr. Rowe feels
"rhe basic operational strucrure has performed reasonably well." He cominues,
"What we real ly have in Bosnia is a competency to hand le one of rhe elemems of
mine action: clearance. lr's rhe main element, bur we particularly need ro
improve even that, and we need better
results from rhe su rvey process." General
goals for rhe operational level include
improvements in survey and inspection
(q uality assurance), as well as a better
mine risk education program and more
thorough minefield marking. Marking
and barriers are especially important in
Bosnia, because as Mr. Rowe po ints our,
"some of these [mine] fields aren't going
to be cleared for a very long time."
According coM r. Gavran, "deminers

and com panies do hono r the [current]
standards, bur there are differences. Before, rhe entities mad e their own
standards. Now, we want [everyone) to
conform to world standards." He believes
char surveyo rs and inspectors especially
muse follow identical standards, designed
and enforced by rhe BHMAC. O ffic ials
need to know exacrly what a surveyor regards as a low- or high-risk area, how he
dercrmi nes rhe presence and s ize of a
mine-suspected area, and rhe methodology used to reach those conclusions so
rhey can properly prioritize demining
projects and demarcate fields rhar won't
soon be clea red. The standardization of
inspectors hardly needs explaining: officials (and civilians) need to know what
an inspector means when he recommends
certification of land as cleared and how
he judged ir so. Did he rake some minedetecting dogs through rhe field, or run
a machine over it, or play hopscotch
down the middle of it? Mr. Gavran feels
that in the past, "every (i nspector) has
added or omitted something" on his/her
reports, leaving uncenainty where none
should be. For inspecto rs and surveyors,
any miscommun ication m ight cause
landm ine casualties.
Mr. Rowe insists, "No dramatic [operational) changes have been pur into
effect, and there's absolutely no reason
why they should immediately be," since
operations do in fact fu nction at a reasonably efficient level, ar least compared
ro rhe management structures being overhauled right now. For now, managemem
problems are more urgent than operatio nal, and winter will soon hair most
operations anyway, giving rhe BHMAC
plenty of rime ro draw up new standards
and priorities and whatever else they determine necessary.
The donor community has shown
keen interest in recent events, as they
should-despite much progress; Bosn ia
sti ll requires heavy financial aid to pull
off their mine action miracle. Ir is certai nly roo soon ro declare corruption in
Bosnia extinct, bur we can safely place ir
on the endangered list for now, as Mr.
Gavran p romises to prove the BHMAC's
trustworthiness through transparency:
"The door of the MAC is open to everyone involved in demin ing in rhe world,"

he declared, ushering in a new level of
information sharing between the MAC
and irs donors.

iffering Roles
In rhe meantime, demining goes on.
Commercial companies, non-governmemal organizations (NGOs), rhe Emiry
arm ies, and Civil Protection forces all
execute dem ining activities in Bosnia.
Each has irs own role, bur in general inte rnati onally funded companies and
NGOs clear most m inefields in civilian
areas, the armies conduct their own
projects in accordance with national priorities, and Civil Protection completes a
small-bur increasing- percentage of
demining activities. Once Bosnia is declared free from the effects of mines, Civil
Protection and Army forces will rake the
lead role, cleaning up residual minefields
and responding co emergencies as necessary. Understanding each demining asset's
strengths and weaknesses is integral co
undersranding Bosnian demining.

NGOs
NGOs complete a large percentage
of the demining tasks in Bosnia each year.
They are ind epen d ently funded (no
Bosnian government support), relatively
stable organizations. Many are foreign
charity groups. The BHMAC has nodirect control over NGOs, save task
allocation, quality control and accreditation. Srill, NGOs typically cry ro act in
rhe nation's best interest, acceding to rhe
BHMAC's wishes- when their donors
have rhe same wishes. Mr. Stephen Bryanr
is rhe Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) program manager for Bosnian operations.
NPA is a major NGO in Bosnia, mainraining a sraffof about 200 Bosnians (and
three ex-pars, including Mr. Bryant) as
they help build local capacity, reach management skills, develop infrastructure-and
do big-rime demining throughout rhe
country. NPA's in volvement in Bosn ia is
typical of many NGOs, and also represents something of an ideal: NPA
maintains an excellent reputation by
regularly achieving irs goals, which delights their donors and draws more
donations, allowing rhem to set even
more ambitious goals. NPA's Bosnia op-
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erarion is a long-term development program that will total about II years.
Significantly, they're about to hand over
demining operations in the Republic of
Srbska to Civil Protection. The transition
has begun.

Commercial Companies
Commercial companies often specialize in one area of demining, allowing
them to complete tasks for less money
than general demining organizations. An
econom isr would say rhar specialized
companies have a comparative advantage
over other groups in their focus area. An
NGO, the government or even another
company often hires a commercial company to complete a specific segment of a
larger job, saving the client money.
Demining companies' concern for the
bottom line leads to dynamic, innovative
and cosr-effecrive solutions to rough
problems. European Land mine Solutions
(ELS) is a company rhar focuses on mechan ical area preparation. When hired,

Drivers show great
pride in their
machines and their
jobs.

a relatively small proportion of the work,
bur in the future, when most priority
minefields are cleared, Civil Protection
will conduct needed spot demining and
emergency calls whenever needed. In the
end, Bosnians will have only Bosnians
demining their nation: the triumphant
endgame of the Bosnian battle against
landmines.

Conclusion

ELS operators rest
beside an NPA
truck. A large
graveyard sprawls
in the distance.

they drive huge armored flails back and
fonh over a minefield, bearing the ground
wirh rotating chains to remove all vegetation. That's it-no clearance, no survey,
just men with huge machines clearing rhe
way for manual deminers or dogs to fo llow. Thorough area preparation removes
annoying brush from deminers' paths and,
more importantly, triggers any tripwires
straddling the minefield. In Bosnia, nearinvisible tripwire filamems often lead to
a nasty Yugoslav mine called the PROM1. When activated, the PROM-l 's
explos ive charge shoots upward about
four feet before detonating, spraying
sh rapnel over a much wider area than
conventional blast mines. Deminers really appreciate ELS' services.
The ELS business model requires
heavy input from Bosnian workers, depending on savvy locals co help the
company improve its operations. According to Mr. Paul Simmons, ELS' Bosnian
office manager, local crews operate and
maintain all of ELS' equipment, learning everything there is to know about
each machine. Then, when demining
operations cease during the winter
months, these same crews give ELS recommendations for improving their

machines, often doing much of the work
themselves. Mr. Simmons added that his
crews included Serbs, C roats, Bosnians,
Muslims, Catholics-groups who were at
each others' throats just seven years ago
now hang out together at the ELS garage
all winter, trading tool rips and shop talk.

Entity Armies/Civil Protection
Immediately after the war, on ly the
Entity armies had any idea where mines
mighr be- they laid many of them, after
all. They were the first wave of demining
activity in Bosnia. The armies' work was
more militarily strategic than humanitarian,
and international NGOs and commercial
companies soon superseded them, bur their
discipline, knowledge and decent equipment
make them valuable assets nonetheless. As
the NGOs and commercial companies
slowly migrate to other demining
hotspots, rhe Entity armies may see their
demining workload increase.
The armies may pick up some of the
demining work, but they have othe r
tasks-such as defending the counrry.
Most demining wi ll eventually fall on
Civil Protection forces, Bosnia's indigenous, civilian-run enforcement squads.
Right now, Civi l Protection undertakes

•

....

120 •

In Bosnia, there hasn't been much
difference between a realist and a cynic,
since neither had anything positive to say
about the future-until now. Suddenly,
optimists are respectable people again.
Mr. Rowe knows better than anyone the
reasons why: "We have a new management ream already in place-there's
finally a real chance for stability. And the
government, with all irs difficult circumstances, has begun to pick up its
responsibilities-chat shows it's inrerested
in getting on with business." For the first
rime since independence, the Bosnian
government has conceived and executed
a plan-the Demining Law-that paves
the way for the resolution of a Bosnian
problem using a Bosnian system that will
evemually rely entirely on national resources. "It's fairly simple, actually," Mr.
Rowe explains. "We are at the point
where the Bosnians can really take the
lead in solving their problems, and that's
always the best way to go!" •

eferences
Most information for this article is from interviews with Mr. David Rowe, Mr. Dusan Gavran,
Mr. Stephen Bryant and Mr. Paul Simmons in
Sarajevo during June and July of2002.1 tha nk them
for their cooperation and hospitality. Any errors,
misinforn1arion or mischaracterization in rhis article is my fault alone.
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Demining During

Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan
The U.S. and Coalition forces' occupation of airfields at Bagram and
Kandahar in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom was initially
ham pered by the presence of a large number of mines and UXO in both the
immediate and surrounding areas of the airfields. U.S. and Coalition forces
quickly came to understand that traditional countermine demining
operations were insufficient to ensure troop habitability and operational
safety in the base area, a situation not foreseen or provided for in current
U.S. Army doctrine. This experience strongly suggests that the U.S. Army
should assess its current countermine doctrine and introduce a doctrinal
modification to take into account the future need to deal with mines and
UXO in and around base areas.

by John L. Wilkinson, Vice
President, Operations, RONCO
Consulting Corporation
Introduction
In many ways, Operation Enduring
Freedom has diverged from the usual pattern of U.S. and Coalition military
operations that developed since the Vietnam War. Whether small-scale operations
such as Urgem Fury in Grenada or Just
Cause in Panama, or much larger-scale opera tions such as Desert Shield/Desert
Srorm in the Gulf or Allied Force in Serbia,
the usual pattern since the 1970s has been
one of mounting operations imo enemy
territory from friendly territory, and the
usual pattern has been not to occupy enemy territory for extended periods of rime.
While Operation Enduring Freedom
began as did the others mentioned above,
with the collapse of the Taliban government, Marine, U.S. Army and Coalition
forces occupied Bagram and Kandahar airfields inside Afghanistan. Both have since
been used as semi-permanent operational
bases from which to conduct further military operations against the remnants ofAI
Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan
and adjoining border areas with Pakistan.
This change of pattern may well be-

come more of the norm as the war against
terrorism progresses and U.S. and Coalition
forces find themselves operating with increasing frequency from bases that are not
necessarily in friendly or non-conflictive territory. As a result, and based on the experience
since February 2002 in Afghanistan, the U.S.
Army's doctrine on dealing with mines is
likely to require revision or, at lease, expansion to account for situations such as those
encountered in Afghanistan.

ine Clearance vs.
emining
In U.S. Army doctrine, there is a
clear delineation of responsibility between
mine clearance operations, which are conducted by the Corps of Engineers, and
removal and disposal of UXO, which is
the responsibility of Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) teams attached to or
integrated with combat units. Furthermore, there is a clear distinction in doctrine
between mine clearance and demining; the
latter, in fact, is nor acknowledged as a
military mission.
Army doctrine calls for breaching or
clearing lines of communication through
minefields, clearly demarcating the
cleared borders, and moving through as
quickly as operationally possible. A cer-
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cain number of casualties are recognized
as inevitable in such operations. Mi litary
minefields are usually laid ro channel or
delay movement, so that direct or indirect fire, or both, can be brought to bear
on an opposing force that has slowed
down or is concentrated at certain predetermined points as it attempts to traverse
or avoid the minefield. As a result, Army
doctrine emphasizes speed in dealing with
such obstacles so as to engage and defeat
the enemy directly, while reducing the exposure of units to enemy fire.
At this poim, it is useful to note that
Army doctrine on mine clearance continues co reflect readiness for a war of rapid
movement, such as was expected in Europe and was carried out in the Gulf War.
On d1e other hand, demining or hw11anitarian demjning, where the goal is to render
defined areas mine !Tee or, more properly, mine
safe, is nor recognized as a military mission in
doctrine. While it is true that U.S. Special
Forces personnel receive training in humanitarian dernining at Fort Leonard Wood, they
do so in order to reach it to foreign military
personnel. In combat, Special Forces do nor
have demining or humanitarian demining as
a mission and they do not, indeed, have mine
clearance as a mission either.

